




Positing a space mirror mechanism:  




Abstract: Recent evidence regarding a novel functionality of the mirror neuron 
system (MNS), a so-called ‘space mirror mechanism’, seems to reinforce the central 
role of the MNS in social cognition. According to the space mirror hypothesis, neural 
mirroring accounts for understanding not just what an observed agent is doing, but 
also the range of potential actions that a suitably located object affords an observed 
agent in the absence of any motor behaviour. This paper aims to show that the 
advocate of this space mirror hypothesis faces a crippling dilemma. Either what 
observed agents can do remains underdetermined by space mirror representations, 
and no proper understanding of action potentiality is gained; or, if it is just 
understanding of potential motor acts that is achieved through the sensorimotor 
representations generated by shared object-related affordances, the very explanatory 






The mirror neuron system (MNS henceforth) is believed to play a crucial role in 
explaining how it is that we come to understand other people’s actions, intentions and 
emotions. Mirror neurons are sensorimotor neurons that fire both when an agent 
executes a goal-oriented motor act (such as grasping, biting or moving an object) and 
when such a motor act is observed—provided that both observer and observed share 
the same motor abilities. According to the mirror neuron hypothesis, this coupling 
between perception and off-line motor execution is the result of a direct matching 
mechanism: the MNS. Witnessing the execution of a goal-oriented motor act induces, 
in the observer’s brain, a pattern of neural activation similar to the pattern that occurs 
during the execution of that act. The tokening of such a similar pattern generates a 
representation that endows the observer with an immediate understanding of the 
witnessed motor act, regardless of the morphology of the movement.  
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 Plainly, however, the same witnessed motor act (e.g., grasping) may serve different 
goals (e.g., grasping for eating or grasping for placing aside) and hence be the result 
of different intentions. A revised version of the action MNS hypothesis resolves this 
problem by invoking a particular subset of mirror neurons. These “logically-related 
mirror neurons” fire differently depending on which motor act typically follows the 
initially observed one in a particular context. In a context in which, e.g., tea is about 
to be served, the activation token that results from witnessing the motor act of 
grasping is shown to be different from the activation token that results from 
witnessing the same motor act in e.g. a context of doing the washing-up. On this 
version, the patterns of activation replicated in the observer’s parietal lobe when 
witnessing a goal-related motor act are thus organized in pre-wired motor chains, 
which differ depending on the motor intention with which the act is executed  
(Fogassi et al., 2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005).1  
 
 A recent paper by Costantini and Sinigaglia (2012) takes the MNS hypothesis a 
step further by showing that grasping-like affordance relations (i.e., the relations 
between features of an object and an agent’s relevant motor abilities) depend not only 
on the object’s falling within an observer’s peripersonal space (i.e., the observer’s 
own reaching space) but also on its falling within the peripersonal space of any 
observed agent, even in the absence of any motor act (see also Caggiano et al., 2009). 
This so-called “mirror mechanism for the peripersonal space” seems to be triggered 
by the sight of an agent and a suitably located object without requiring that the agent 
perform any goal-directed motor act involving the object—again, as long as the 
observer is endowed with the same motor abilities as the observed agent. The 
observed agent’s available potential for action is thus mapped, they claim, onto the 
observer’s own motor repertoire. This suggests, Costantini and Sinigaglia further 
contend, that the observer understands the range of potential actions available to the 
observed agent from the inside—as the set of potential actions is partially constituted 
by the shared object-related affordances in the observed agent’s peripersonal space 
(Costantini & Sinigaglia, 2012, p. 447–50). 
                                               
1 In what follows, whenever I refer to the action MNS hypothesis, I shall be referring to the version of 
the hypothesis that incorporates these findings. I will maintain the qualifier “revised” only at places 
where the context makes it important to stress their relevance. 
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 The aim of this paper is not to challenge the plausibility of this claim per se or the 
plausibility of the alleged general MNS mindreading functionality. Rather, I highlight 
a tension between the new space mirror hypothesis and the action MNS hypothesis 
with regard to the right level of action individuation, and hence potential action 
individuation, required for granting understanding of either kind. My argument takes 
the form of a dilemma. On the one hand, if it is only through the activation of 
logically-related mirror neurons that we can explain the understanding of an 
(otherwise intention-plural) witnessed goal-directed motor act, then it will be difficult 
to justify, by the action MNS theorist’s own lights, that, in the absence of any motor 
act, the representations generated by the space mirror mechanism can contribute in 
any specific way to the explanation of the understanding of potential actions— 
inasmuch as this requires an understanding of potential motor intentions. On the other 
hand, if it is just understanding of potential motor acts, and not potential motor 
actions, that space mirror representations account for, and we thus conceive of them 
as sensorimotor representations of object-related affordances, then all the explanatory 
work appears to be done by the enactive dynamics of such affordances, leaving no 
significant explanatory role for the space mirror hypothesis itself. The notion of 
shared object-related affordance also seems better suited for theoretical treatments in 
which neural predictive coding and not neural mirroring is the key explanatory 
property. 
 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, I introduce the MNS 
hypothesis and detail how it has evolved hand in hand with new experimental results. 
In Section 3, I then sketch three versions of what I would here like to call “the 
intentional worry”: Csibra’s (2005, 2007), Borg’s (2007) and Jacob’s (2008)—
together with a powerful reply by Sinigaglia (2007). The intentional worry amounts to 
questioning the idea that motor mirroring can directly transform motor-act perception 
into a univocal representation of an observed agent’s intention.2 In Section 4, I present 
evidence that Costantini and Sinigaglia (2012) take to support the new space mirror 
hypothesis and discuss their suggestion that ‘the mirror mechanism for the 
                                               
2 All these versions of the intentional worry thus question the idea that action mirroring is a sufficient 
condition for intentional understanding. See also Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005. Some authors (e.g. Jacob, 
2008) also argue that action mirroring is not even a necessary condition for generating this type of 
understanding. 
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peripersonal space appears to bridge the gap between the motor-based affordance 
perception and the mirror-based action understanding, playing a key role in 
understanding from the inside what another individual is really doing’ (ibid., p. 450). 
In Section 5, I construct the first horn of the aforementioned dilemma. Finally, in 
Section 6, I argue for the claims of the second horn. I do so by providing what I take 
to be a more charitable interpretation of how the new space mirror functionality ought 
to be understood—an interpretation that locates the proposal within an embedded, 
embodied and extended view of cognition and an enactive view of perception.  
 
 
2. The MNS hypothesis 
 
Mirror neurons were first discovered in the ventral premotor cortex of macaque 
monkeys, located in an area called F5 (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Gallese et al., 1996) 
and later on in a rostral inferior parietal area, area PF (Gallese et al., 2002) 
reciprocally connected with area F5 (Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001). Neurons in area PF 
are also connected to others in the superior temporal cortex, specifically in the 
superior temporal sulcus. This whole cortical circuit, the MNS, seems to be dedicated 
to the generation of motor representations both when a goal-directed motor act is 
executed and when one is witnessed—but not when performing or witnessing 
movements which do not have a goal or when an action is pantomimed. In the case of 
witnessing a goal-directed motor act, the motor neural activation in the observer’s 
brain replicates the motor activation that occurs during the execution of the act, but 
without issuing any commands to act.  
 
 A similar circuit seems to be present in humans, where neurophysiological and 
behavioural evidence has been taken to confirm that the MNS hypothesis sheds light 
on a variety of cognitive capacities such as understanding language (Rizzolatti & 
Arbib, 1998) and learning to imitate (Rizzolatti et al., 2001), as well as on 
understanding actions and intentions (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2006. See 
also Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004 for a review).3 With regard to this last line of 
                                               
3 There are some differences between MNS functionality in humans and in monkeys. The array of 
actions sensitive to MNS activation is wider in humans and it seems to be more sensitive to the timing 
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research—the subject of this paper—it is important to stress that F5 premotor neuron 
activation patterns seem to code not the morphology of the observed motor act, i.e., 
not the individual fine movements of a given motor act, such as the flexing of the 
fingers, but the action type. When, e.g., grasping a piece of food, the same mirror 
neurons fire in the observer’s MNS regardless of the particular movements the 
observed agent performs, e.g., whether it is with the right or left hand, or with the 
mouth (Rizzolatti et al., 2000). Even when the movements required to execute a 
particular motor act, e.g. grasping, are the opposite of standard movements, as in 
experiments involving reverse action pliers, all the same neurons in the premotor 
ventral cortex fire, maintaining the same sequence with respect to different phases of 
the grasping in relation to the goal-related action of the pliers (see Umiltà et al., 
2008). MNS activation thus suggests the existence of a direct match between the 
perception and the execution of a goal-related motor act. It has been taken to 
constitute the neural basis of the processes by which agents make sense of behaviour 
witnessed in others. 
 
 Initial overenthusiastic claims made it sound as if MNS activation was the key to 
explaining the automatic and non-inferential way in which we seem to “read” the 
minds of others (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Recently, a more cautious approach has 
been adopted. Both Gallese and Goldman, albeit separately, now acknowledge that 
elements other than MNS activation—such as projection and theorizing—play an 
important role in what is taken to be the right theory of mindreading (Gallese, 2003; 
2007; Goldman, 2006). Even so, the spirit of the original hypothesis remains pretty 
much the same. The central claim is still that mirror neuron activation directly 
matches what an agent is observed to do in terms of the goal that typically 
characterizes the observed motor act, thus endowing the observer with an 
understanding of what the observed agent is doing (Rizzolatti, G. & Sinigaglia, C., 
2008b). Two crucial sets of experiments have contributed to making the MNS 
hypothesis more plausible in this respect: Iacoboni et al. (2005) and Fogassi et al. 
(2005). These experiments give rise to a revised and improved version of the MNS 
hypothesis. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
of the observed motor acts. See e.g. Miall (2003) and Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia (2008a). Such differences 
can be ignored for the purposes of this paper. 
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 The experiments carried out by Fogassi et al. (2005) were based on recordings of 
single-cell firing patterns in macaque monkeys. They tested the sensitivity of parietal 
mirror neurons to the intention with which a single motor act of hand–grasping was 
executed: whether it was hand–grasping for eating or hand–grasping for placing aside. 
They showed that inferior parietal lobule mirror neurons were sensitive to the motor 
intention from the very beginning of the movement. They triggered pre-wired motor 
chains that were different for each of the two motor intentions with which the 
grasping motor act was carried out.4  
 
 In their experiments performed on humans, Iacoboni and collaborators report the 
same phenomenon. Through the use of fMRI, they recorded the activation of lateral 
fronto-parietal circuits of the MNS while subjects watched a video of an agent lifting 
a cup in two different contexts. In one context, the clues suggested that drinking was 
the motor intention behind the lifting. The clues in the other context, in contrast, 
suggested that the relevant action was placing aside for washing. The study suggests 
that the pattern of activation of parietal mirror neurons that occurs when witnessing 
the motor act of grasping in a drinking context is different from the pattern of 
activation that occurs when the witnessed motor act forms part of placing the cup 
aside to be washed. 
 
 In both sets of experiments, the difference in patterns of activation was taken to be 
due to the particular subset of logically-related mirror neurons that was triggered, 
which, in turn, seems to depend on the goal related to the observed motor act in the 
given context. The relation between the motor act and its goal, however, is not one of 
logical necessity, but rather it is probabilistic or inductive. The relation is between 
two motor acts, the second functionally or typically related to the first, observed act. 
Iacoboni et al. (2005, p. 533) sum up their findings as follows:  
 
Our results suggest that a subset of mirror neurons in the inferior frontal cortex 
discharge in response to the motor acts that are most likely to follow the observed 
one. In other words, … there is activation of classical mirror neurons, plus 
activation of another set of neurons coding other potential actions sequentially 
related to the observed one. This interpretation of our findings implies that, in 
addition to the classically described mirror neurons that fire during the execution 
and observation of the same motor act (e.g., observed and executed grasping), 
                                               
4 See also Cattaneo et al. (2007). 
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there are neurons that are visually triggered by a given motor act (e.g., grasping 
observation), but discharge during the execution not of the same motor act, but of 
another act, functionally related to the observed act (e.g., bringing to the mouth). 
Neurons of this type have indeed been previously reported in F5 and referred to as 
“logically related” neurons … The present findings not only allow one to attribute 
a functional role to these “logically related” mirror neurons, but also suggest that 




The discovery of these chains of pre-wired mirror neurons strengthens the MNS 
hypothesis, which can thus account for different motor intentions behind a particular 
motor act. Or so it seems. 
  
 
3. The intentional worry 
 
Despite these, without a doubt very exciting, experimental results, some philosophers 
and cognitive scientists still remain sceptical about the claim that action MNS 
activation can explain the observers’ apparent understanding of an observed agent’s 
intention. Philosophers tend to distinguish between basic actions, e.g., pressing a 
switch, and non-basic actions, e.g., turning on the light. The latter are performed by 
carrying out the former. They also often make a parallel distinction between motor 
intentions (or “intentions in action”) and “prior” intentions. They usually characterize 
a motor intention as an intention to carry out a basic action (Searle, 1983; Pacherie, 
2000). The idea is that while basic actions are the result of an agent’s motor 
intentions, non-basic actions are controlled by the agent’s prior intentions. What still 
remains contentious is thus whether action mirroring can generate the kind of 
representations involved in making sense of an observed agent’s prior intention.  
 
 A great concern is the exact relationship between lower-level mirroring and the 
higher-level perception-based theorizing that lies at the heart of the mirror neuron 
hypothesis. In Csibra’s words (2007, pp. 446–447): 
 
All these findings reflect a tension between two conflicting claims about action 
mirroring implied by the direct-matching hypothesis: the claim that action 
mirroring reflects low-level resonance mechanisms, and the claim that it reflects 
high-level action understanding. The tension arises from the fact that the more it 
seems that mirroring is nothing else but faithful duplication of observed actions, 
the less evidence it provides for action understanding; and the more mirroring 
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represents high-level interpretation of the observed actions, the less evidence it 
provides that this interpretation is generated by low-level motor duplication. 
   
 
This quote nicely illustrates what I call here ‘the intentional worry’.5 The intentional 
worry is just one species from a genus of concerns that relate to the idea that certain 
low-level cognitive properties or events are insufficient on their own to account for 
certain higher-level cognitive properties or events, which thus remain 
underdetermined. Marr’s computational theory of vision is usually invoked to 
illustrate this class of problems, since prima facie the 2D impressions our retina 
makes of perceived objects and scenes in the world are not sufficient to create the 3D 
perceptual representations that constitute what an agent sees. In the same way in 
which, e.g., a set of edges and regions in space can be the lower-level representation 
of very different 3D objects, the same mirroring triggered by the observation of some 
agent’s motor behaviour can represent very different actions, depending on the 
intentions with which such motor acts are executed. Interestingly, the intentional 
worry acquires its sharpest form precisely against the experimental results that 
seemed to settle the worry in the first place—those results that marked the beginning 
of the revised MNS hypothesis that I sketched in Section 2. 
 
 Csibra (2007), for instance, points out that it is not clear that the MNS activation 
demonstrated by Fogassi’s and Iacoboni’s sets of experiments provides conclusive 
evidence that such mirroring could be interpreted as being directly responsible for an 
observer’s understanding of what an observed agent is doing, in the sense of 
understanding the (prior) intention with which the agent executes a particular motor 
act. Instead, he claims, the experiments show that MNS activation is somehow 
involved when witnessing an agent executing a motor act, but this may only reflect 
the perceptual reconstruction of the agent’s intention at a higher cognitive level. 
Csibra questions the MNS as a direct, i.e., un-interpreted, matching mechanism 
between sensory and motor information. Instead, he treats MNS activation as the 
result of a transformation of an already perceptually understood intention into a motor 
format. In a classic passage (Csibra, 2007, p. 441), he contends: 
 
                                               
5 See also Csibra, 2005; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005; and Jacob, 2008. 
 9 
Just as the mechanism of imitation is always emulation at a lower level, the 
mechanism of motor mirroring is always reconstruction. There is no mysterious 
mirroring process that directly transforms action observation into motor code. 
Rather, the observed action is analyzed at some level of precision and the result of 
this analysis is mapped onto the observer’s motor system. One can call this 
mapping process ‘direct matching’ (Rizzolatti et al., 2001) and such mappings may 
be established by ‘direct’ associations, but what is mapped during mirroring is not 
an uninterpreted signal but a description of the observed action at some level of the 
action hierarchy. The fine details of the resulting motor activation in the observer 
do not directly originate from the observation but are reconstructed from this 
description.6 
 
Jacob (2008), arguing along the same lines, identifies a tension between the original 
MNS hypothesis, based on the idea of motor simulation as a way of enabling the 
observer to retrodict the intention of the observed agent’s motor act in light of the 
movements observed, and the revised MNS hypothesis, where logically-related 
neurons seem to be playing a very different role, namely, the role of a predictive 
mechanism—predicting the next most likely motor act given a particular context. 
Following an argument similar to that of Csibra, a possible interpretation of MNS 
activation in the light of the new experiments, Jacob further contends, is that such 
activation presupposes, rather than generates, a representation of the observed agent’s 
(prior) intention derived from the visual information provided by the context (see also 
Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). 
 
 Borg (2007), in another version of the intentional worry, argues that the very idea 
of context-dependent functionally-related motor acts only makes sense by appealing 
to the (prior) intention of the observed agent—precisely what that context-dependent 
connection between motor acts is supposed to explain. First of all, she claims, not all 
intentions have a set of typical, functionally-related motor acts associated with them. I 
can grasp a teacup with the intention of washing it or with the intention of looking at 
it just to see, for instance, whether it is clean. Secondly, different patterns of MNS 
activation should, according to the new hypothesis, encode different overall 
intentions. Yet, an agent may have the same intention (e.g., to tidy up) while 
executing very different motor acts. Lastly, Borg argues, one and the same pattern of 
MNS activation, including the firing of the same logically-related neurons, may still 
correspond to very different intentions. A cup may be placed to one side with the 
                                               
6 See also Csibra & Gergely, 2007. 
 10 
intention of tidying up, but also with the intention of bringing it closer so as to finish 
drinking the tea in it. In general, the way in which the action MNS hypothesis 
explains the attribution of intention to observed agents appeals to typical behaviour by 
way of the notion of a logically-related motor act. Yet, a motor act is typical or 
logically related to some other only when viewed as part of an overall, i.e., prior 
intention. Borg thus concludes (2007, p. 16): 
 
What one is likely to do next depends not just on features of the context and the 
initial act in that context but on the complex network of one’s beliefs and desires. 
Yet this fact threatens to render the proposed explanation circular: the revised MN 
hypothesis seeks to attribute mental states to agents via an appeal to typical 
behaviour, but one can isolate typical behaviour only in terms of one’s attribution 
of mental states. 
 
 Conrado Sinigaglia (2008, 2009) is perhaps the philosopher who has provided the 
most detailed and persuasive reply to this kind of consideration. In his (2008), he 
argues directly against Borg’s (2007) version of the intentional worry and in favour of 
the relevance of Iacoboni’s and Fogassi’s findings. Sinigaglia’s main contention is 
that the intentional worry only appears justified because we remain attached to a far 
too mentalistic notion of understanding intentions. Yet, he claims, if we viewed the 
understanding of intentions that the MNS provides in terms of motor aboutness, i.e., 
in terms of the motor act’s goal-relatedness, the worry would fade away. Sinigaglia is 
quite explicit about this point in his (2009, p. 319) when he claims: 
 
Quite apart from being the outcome of whatever prior belief and desire I had, my 
act of grasping, like every other basic motor act, is defined by its own motor goal-
relatedness that makes the coherent composition of the various movements to be 
executed possible, enabling me to control them. It is such motor goal-relatedness 
that allows someone else to immediately understand what I am doing (and maybe 
why I am doing it), i.e. to immediately recognize that the movements of my hand 
are something more than mere bodily movements, that is, that they are part of a 
specific motor act (or a specific chain of motor acts), directed toward a certain 
object (with a certain shape, a certain size, etc.) in a given way (grasping). 
 
Doubtless there are many moves and counter-moves that could be pursued at this 
point. Especially pressing is the philosophical question of which is the correct level of 
description for action individuation. But rather than getting submerged in this 
dialectic, I propose to look at a new and interesting MNS functionality that seems to 
reinforce Sinigaglia’s idea and thereby the central explanatory role that the MNS 
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hypothesis plays in intentional understanding, i.e., understanding of motor goal-
relatedness. In what follows, I work with a notion of intention that is close to this idea 
of motor goal-relatedness (Sinigaglia, 2009). I grant the MNS theorist’s claim that 
those who conceive intention as a propositional attitude which plays a critical role in 
planning action and in practical reasoning, and is subject to characteristic norms of 
rationality (see e.g. Bratman, 1987), deploy an unwarranted intellectualism. I thus 
concede that both proximal goals (e.g., grasping) and distal goals (e.g., grasping for 
drinking) can be represented at the motor level, without appealing to propositional 
attitudes.7 My argument only requires that we appreciate the distinction between 
motor-act and motor intention, where this latter notion is meant to capture the motor 
goal-relatedness of a particular motor act.  
 
 
4. The mirror mechanism for peripersonal space: 
Understanding action potentiality 
 
 
The notion of affordance, originally introduced by Gibson (1977), captures the 
relation between certain environmental features and a subject’s abilities to act upon 
them. So-called grasping-like affordances or micro-affordances (Ellis & Tacker, 
2000) refer, in particular, to the relation between the features of an observed, 
graspable object and the particular motor abilities that such a potential quality of the 
object calls for in the observer. Observing a mug, for instance, affords a reaching-to-
grasp motor act to an agent with the potential to reach for the mug and grasp it; 
likewise, the sight of a doorknob affords, according to this view, a reaching-for-
pulling motor act to a suitably endowed subject.  
 
 There are well-known behavioural experiments that support the idea that the 
particular features of a graspable object provoke a relevant set of grasping 
potentialities, even when the subject does not have any intention to act upon the 
object (Craighero et al., 1999). At the neurological level, fMRI studies show that 
perceiving a graspable object triggers mirror neurons in the left premotor cortex and 
the inferior parietal lobule even when no motor act is executed. They also show that 
the same neural circuits that encode motor acts such as hand–grasping also fire simply 
                                               
7 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this issue. 
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when an appropriately able subject perceives the object-related features that allow or 
invite those acts (see e.g. Chao & Martin, 2000; Grezes et al., 2003).  
 
 In an attempt to reinforce the importance of the MNS in our understanding of 
intentions and actions, and with the ultimate aim of connecting affordance theory and 
social cognition, Costantini and Sinigaglia (2012) have recently run some very 
interesting experiments that focus on object-related affordances. The first step in 
establishing the desired connection is their re-characterization of the micro-affordance 
relation as dependent on a further enabling condition; a spatial component defined in 
terms of the observer’s peripersonal space, i.e., the space within reach of the 
observer’s limbs. In one of the crucial experiments that support this redefinition of the 
micro-affordance notion, they record the electric potential from the first dorsal 
interosseous and opponens pollicis muscles (the so-called ‘motor evoked potential’: 
MEP) following transcranial stimulation of the left primary motor cortex while 
participants in the experiment observed a 3D room in which a mug rested on a table. 
The mug was situated either within the participant’s peripersonal space (within 30 
cm) or in their extrapersonal space—i.e., at least 150 cm away. They found that, when 
the mug was within the observer’s peripersonal space, the MEP amplitude was greater 
than when the mug was located outside this reachable space. Based on these results, 
Costantini and Sinigaglia suggest that the grasping affordance depends not only on 
the constitutive relation between the mug’s graspable features and the observer’s 
motor abilities, but also on an additional enabling spatial relation that makes the 
constitutive relation possible, i.e., the relation captured by the notion of peripersonal 
space. The graspability of an object, they conclude, depends on its being within an 
agent’s peripersonal space (Costantini & Sinigaglia, 2012, p. 440).  
 
 The next question Costantini and Sinigaglia raise is whether the spatial relation 
that enables grasping-like affordances may be constituted not only by a single 
individual’s peripersonal space, but also by the peripersonal space of an observed 
agent—again, as long as the motor capacities of observer and observed agent are 
suitably matched. It is here that the MNS hypothesis becomes relevant to the 
discussion. Costantini and Sinigaglia refer to experiments involving the recording of 
single-cell firing patterns in macaque monkeys which show that bimodal neurons in 
the ventral intraparietal area (VIP) discharge not only when there is visual or tactile 
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stimulation within the peripersonal space of the monkey, but also at the sight of such 
stimulation within the peripersonal space of another individual facing the monkey—
the experimenter (Ishida et al., 2009). The neurons did not discharge when the same 
visual stimulus was presented outside the monkey’s peripersonal space but without 
the experimenter being present. They exhibited the strongest response when the 
stimulus was within approximately 30 cm of either body, i.e., within each body’s 
peripersonal space: not when located between 60 and 90 cm from the bodies—i.e., 
outside both bodies’ peripersonal space. This suggests ‘the existence of a mirror 
mechanism mapping the peripersonal space of others onto the observer’s own 
peripersonal space, at least in the visuo-tactile domain’ (Costantini & Sinigaglia, 
2012, p. 444).  
 
 Costantini and Sinigaglia report their own behavioural experiments in which they 
show that even the presence of an inanimate dummy or avatar (but not just any 
relevantly similar object, such as a cylinder) prompts a remapping of the observer’s 
own peripersonal space so as to make an object outside the observer’s peripersonal 
space, but within the peripersonal space of the avatar, “ready-to-hand”. They claim: 
‘[o]ur proposal is that the extension of the space constraint of the affordance relation 
from an individual to another one is likely to be due to a space mirror mechanism that 
allows the individual to match others’ surrounding space with her own peripersonal 
space, thus mapping others’ action potentialities onto her own motor abilities’ 
(Costantini & Sinigaglia, 2012, p. 445). What is most interesting about these 
experiments is the suggestion that an observer need not witness the execution of any 
particular motor act in order to map the observed agent’s action potentialities onto 
their own. ‘Our study’ Costantini and Sinigaglia (2012, p. 449) contend, ‘clearly 
indicates that there is no need for the participants to be witnessing an action 
performed by someone else in order to map the surrounding space of another 
individual onto their own peripersonal space. The space mirror mechanism is motor in 
nature because of the motor and action-dependent nature of peripersonal space itself.’ 
The idea is that, in the same way as the mirror mechanism for action reproduces off-
line the motor behaviour of an observed agent, the mirror mechanism for the 
peripersonal space reproduces off-line the set of potential actions afforded by an 
object situated in the observed agent’s peripersonal space. Their suggestion is that 
such a space mirror mechanism (Costantini & Sinigaglia, 2012, p. 450): 
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allows one to grasp another body as a set of motor potentialities that are actually 
ready-to-hand, whose range and effectiveness are dependent on and strictly 
intertwined with their own reachable space.  
 
Costantini and Sinigaglia (Ibid., p. 450) thus conclude: ‘If all of this is right, the 
mirror mechanism for the peripersonal space appears to bridge the gap between the 
motor-based affordance perception and the mirror-based action understanding, 




5. Pre-wired motor chain organization and space mirror mechanism: 
The first horn of a dilemma 
 
 
As we have just seen, the main attraction of the space mirror mechanism is that its 
functionality seems to endow an observer with an understanding, or perhaps pre-
comprehension, of an observed agent’s range of potential actions in the absence of 
any motor act. In Costantini and Sinigaglia’s own words (2012, p. 450): 
 
Below and before the effective execution of an action by another individual, the 
mirror mechanism for the peripersonal space unveils the space of actions that are 
really possible for that individual given a certain situation, providing the observer 
with an immediate pre-comprehension of the effective realm of her own agency as 
well as of what she could really do. 
 
Now, thus portrayed, the space mirror hypothesis seems to be open to a rather 
straightforward objection. The firing patterns of logically-related neurons can be 
interpreted as providing direct understanding of motor actions only because they code 
for sequences of motor acts that typically follow an observed motor act in a certain 
context and thereby determine the motor goal-relatedness of that initial motor act, i.e., 
its motor intention. Similarly, the function of the space mirror mechanism can be 
interpreted as providing direct understanding of motor action potentiality only if we 
assume that there are typical motor acts that an object affords. Now, it has long been 
known that, in addition to mirror neurons, a group of cells known as “canonical 
neurons” not only respond to motor act execution, but also code for sensorimotor 
information; they respond to the observation of objects which afford certain motor 
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acts. Canonical neurons are visuo–motor neurons located in the ventral premotor 
cortex (area F5, close to the mirror neurons). They are active both in the execution of 
motor acts and in sensory responses to the size, shape and orientation of objects which 
are not acted upon; they respond to object affordances. Canonical neurons code for, 
e.g., specific grips given the size and shape of an observed object (see e.g. Sakata et 
al., 1995). Once the space mirror functionality is incorporated to account for shared 
object-related affordances, its role can only be taken to be the transformation of such 
visuo-motor information regarding the perceived object into typically afforded motor 
acts. What is thereby understood can thus only be described at the level of motor act 
behaviour (e.g., grasping) not at the required level of motor intention (e.g., grasping 
for drinking)—required, that is, to justify the claim that space mirroring activation 
accounts for ‘a preliminary understanding of what others could do given that 
situation’ (Costantini and Sinigaglia, 2012, p. 451).8   
 
 There thus seems to be a tension between what is taken to be the right level of 
action individuation within the action mirror hypothesis and what is taken to be the 
right level of (potential) action individuation within the space mirror hypothesis. To 
best appreciate this aspect of the problem, let us focus on the following quote from 
Sinigaglia in which he considers the activation of logically-related mirror neurons 
(2008, p. 84 emphasis added): 
 
 Whether their activation reflects the goal-relatedness of an individual motor act or 
is modulated by the overall goal that identifies the action of which the individual 
motor act is a part, depends on their motor properties, more than on their mirror 
properties, on whether they are organized in motor chains in which each single act 
is coded within a specific hierarchy of goals. In other words, it is due to this motor 
chain organization that grasping is not just grasping for grasping’s sake, but is a 
grasping to carry food to the mouth and eat, or a grasping-to-move X from A to B, 
etc., both when the actions are done by the agent him/herself and when the agent 
observes someone else performing the actions.  
 
                                               
8 Despite their focus on shared object-related affordances, Costantini and Sinigaglia often, as in the 
quote above, seem to be arguing for the general claim that the space mirror mechanism is the first step 
in the motor representation of what an observed agent is really doing, inasmuch as it provides the 
observer with a motor representation of the potential for action that a given situation affords. Yet, this 
does not seem to be the case for all kinds of motor acts; it does not seem to be plausible in the case of 
intransitive motor acts, and in the case of communicative motor acts in particular. Many intransitive 
motor acts, by their very nature, consist of unpredictable movements. With regard to intransitive motor 
acts, it is difficult to see what the role of the postulated space mirror mechanism might be. I thank an 
anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention. 
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As I hope Section 1 and the preceding quote make clear, the role of pre-wired motor 
chain organization is crucial in warranting the claim that action mirroring activation 
provides an understanding of what a witnessed agent is doing—an understanding of 
the motor goal-relatedness of a specific motor act. It goes without saying, of course, 
that nothing can be logically related to a motor act that has not been executed. So, all 
the space mirror theorist would be entitled to claim, in such situations, is that the 
generated representations would endow the observer with an understanding of 
potential motor acts. Yet, motor acts without motor goal-relatedness fail to establish, 
by the mirror theorist’s own lights, the observed agents’ motor intentions—they fail to 
individuate motor actions. Hence what the observed agent can do remains 
underdetermined, and no proper understanding of action potentiality is gained. 
  
 Furthermore, in cases of overt goal-related action observation, it would be the 
function of logically-related neurons, as per the MNS action hypothesis, to code for 
the overall intention with which the act was executed—to individuate what the agent 
is doing. Yet, in such cases, the functionality of the space mirror mechanism would be 
overshadowed by the functionality of the action mirror mechanism, as it is difficult to 
see how coding for object-related shared affordances at the level of motor act 
potentiality, i.e., grasping, could add anything to an already fixed understanding of 
motor intentions, i.e., grasping-for-drinking, courtesy of logically-related motor 
chains. 
 
 Alternatively, it could be argued that shared affordances help identify overall 
intentions in virtue of their bringing out unique and relevant perceptual background 
information that causes—in the observer—the firing of preferential paths of 
statistically frequent actions that a given object affords in a given context. Yet, this 
kind of reply would jeopardize the view of the MNS as a locus of sensorimotor 
activation, for it would make perceptual representations the explanatory key to our 
understanding of action potentialities. In fact, a perception-based type of relational 
representation interestingly labelled “affordance structure” plays an important role in 
the account of intentional understanding and social cognition provided by Csibra and 
Gergely (2007). Those psychologists defend the idea of a purely perceptual goal 
attribution mechanism, which they dub teleological reasoning, as an alternative to the 
MNS hypothesis for explaining the understanding that we seem to have of observed 
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motor behaviour.9 They take the notion of affordance structure, understood in terms 
of background information about mutual physical constrains between an actor and a 
situation, to be part of this perceptual goal attribution mechanism. Where the task is 
that of understanding the goal of an observed agent’s action through observation, they 
claim (Csibra & Gergely, 2007, p. 72):  
 
What is required for this task is a causal analysis of the affordance structure of 
the observed actions and the artifacts they involve in order to recover which 
elements of those actions (and artifact use) are necessary and sufficient for 
producing the desired effect.  
 
This would allow us, Csibra and Gergely contend, to determine which feature of the 
observed action is relevant to understanding the observed agent’s overall intention. If 
Csibra and Gergely are right, the notion of affordance structure calls for a perceptual 
reconstruction of action potentialities, which are thus recognized and interpreted at a 
higher level of cognitive processing, prior to their being activated as sensorimotor 
representations. Hence, were we to construe the notion of shared affordances along 
the same lines as Csibra and Gergely’s notion of affordance structure, the advocate of 
the space mirror mechanism would seem committed to claiming that specific motor 
mirroring activation depends on shared object-related affordance that is already 
perceptually interpreted, which would, of course, undermine the central view of MNS 
activation as essentially motor in nature.  
 
 To sum up, space mirroring, without a witnessed motor act, would fail to explain 
understanding of action potentiality, unless some prior selection process grounded in 
perceptual representations is invoked. At the same time, where the witnessed 
behaviour is of an ordinary goal-related action, the action mirror functionality makes 




                                               
9 Alternative or perhaps complementary, not just to the MNS hypothesis, but also to the action-effect 
association view, according to which understanding other agents’ motor behaviour is based on 
bidirectional associations between actions and their effect (see e.g. Elsner, 2007). Unlike Cisbra’s solo 
papers (2005, 2007), together in this article the authors seem to suggest that MNS-based explanatory 
frameworks —what they call simulation procedures— may be compatible with their teleological 
reasoning model of goal attribution.  
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6. Shared object-related affordances and the explanatory role of the 
space mirror hypothesis: The second horn of the dilemma 
 
In this final section of the paper, I want to pursue a different strategy; for it could be 
argued that my criticisms give too much weight to the role of intellectualist theorizing 
in the way we understand other creatures’ potential actions—precisely the role that 
the space mirror hypotheses aims to challenge. It could furthermore be shown that a 
more charitable characterization of the hypothesis would locate it within an enactive 
and embodied view of social cognition and perception—a view that challenges the 
traditional dichotomy between perception and action, and which may thus help 
resolve the difficulties encountered in the previous section.  
 
 Although Costantini and Sinigaglia (2012) do not explicitly endorse enactivism or 
embodiedness in order to support their hypothesis, it is clear that the postulated space 
mirror mechanism fits seamlessly into such a theoretical framework.10 On the one 
hand, the idea of affordance naturally belongs to a view of embedded and embodied 
cognition characterized in terms of the exchange between the physical/biological 
features of an organism and those of the environment in which the organism is 
embedded and functioning. The notion of shared affordance further emphasizes that 
the environment can be so complex as to include other agents and the objects within 
their reach. Such a notion thus distinctly echoes a view of brain–body–world 
relationships not just as dynamically coupled, but also as extending beyond the 
agent’s skin—one of the central tenets of the view known as extended cognition (see 
e.g. Clark & Chalmers, 1998). On the other hand, the very function of the space 
mirror mechanism seems to fit well with a sensorimotor, enactive account of 
perception, according to which perceiving is a form of acting. In contrast to more 
traditional views of perception, the enactivist holds that perception is constituted by 
agents’ abilities to explore and interact in specific ways with the environment in 
which they are embedded. The idea, defended among others by Alva Noë (2004), is 
that to perceive is not to internally register sensory stimuli, but to master certain 
sensorimotor skills. The mastery of sensorimotor skills, seen as an understanding of 
the ways in which the appearances of objects change in response to an agent’s 
                                               
10 Sinigaglia (2009) does explicitly defend the role of MNS within an enactive approach to social 
cognition.  
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movements and exploratory behaviour in the world, is taken to be constitutive of 
perception. This seems to be the relevant context in which to understand properly 
Costantini and Sinigaglia’s claim (2012, p. 449) that: ‘the mirror mechanism for the 
peripersonal space has to be construed as primarily motor in nature.’ 
 
 By locating the space mirror mechanism for the peripersonal space within this 
framework, we thus appear to be able to challenge a distinction that seems to drive 
some of the criticisms raised in the previous section: the distinction between motor 
simulation and covert action imitation. For, if the representations generated by the 
space mirror mechanism are taken to be motor in nature, then such representations are 
best conceived of as the array of sensorimotor skills afforded by particular objects in 
specific situations—including situations in which the objects are suitably located 
within the peripersonal space of an observed agent. Thus conceived, such motor 
representations become much better candidates to contribute to the understanding of 
action potentiality in observed agents. According to this interpretation of the space 
mirror hypothesis, when observing another agent whose peripersonal space contains 
an object, the observer would be able to understand the potential motor acts available 
to the agent based on an understanding of the sensorimotor contingencies that such an 
object affords the agent in that particular context. There need not be any specific 
motor act executed because, on this interpretation, the function of the space mirror 
mechanism would just be to code for sensorimotor contingencies. It would be the 
understanding of these sensorimotor contingencies, which the observer makes their 
own, that enables the observer to understand the observed agent’s array of potential 
acts.  
 
 It is important to note that I am hereby granting a notion of motor act which is 
stripped of any putative intellectualist undertone that the contrasting notion of motor 
intention may carry, since on the minimalist reading of motor intention adopted in the 
previous section—a reading that the advocates of the MNS hypothesis endorse—there 
is no motor intention understanding without motor goal-relatedness understanding. 
Yet, if this is the correct interpretation of the hypothesis, there does not appear to be 
any explanatory work left for the mirroring in the space mirroring functionality; for 
the key explanatory notion here is that of shared object-related affordance—a notion 
that seems to call for neural representations that code not just for the causes of current 
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sensory information, but for the anticipated trajectory of future states. The notion of 
shared object-related affordance seems to call, in other words, for a view of the brain 
as a predictive engine rather than as a mirroring engine. Indeed, once Costantini and 
Sinigaglia’s space mirror functionality is located within this enactive view of 
perception, the alleged understanding of action potentiality in cases where there is no 
overt motor act seems to be much better accounted for by some version or other of the 
so-called predictive coding hypothesis—not the space mirror hypothesis.  
 
 To even try to summarize what has become one of the most influential views in 
computational neuroscience goes far beyond the scope of this paper. I will say just 
enough to justify my suggestion above. One of the main functions of our brain is to 
enable us to cope successfully with our environment by representing it in such a way 
as to allow us to execute the most appropriate action at each particular moment. 
According to the predictive coding hypothesis (see e.g. Bar, 2007; Dayan et al., 1995; 
Friston, 2009; 2010; Hohwy et al., 2008; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Rao and Ballard, 
1999), higher-level cortical processing regions in our brain anticipate what the next 
perceptual input to a lower-level cortical processing region is going to be. Such 
predictions are based on information already in place about the structure of the world 
and how likely it is, given such a higher-level model of the causal structure of the 
world, that a certain state of affairs will follow the state we are in. High-level 
predictions are sometimes inaccurate, i.e., the higher-level processing regions of the 
brain make predictive errors and have therefore to adjust so as to lessen the 
disagreement between the prediction and the lower-level input. In doing so, however, 
they encode a very detailed and large amount of information about the source of the 
perceptual signals that reach the lower-level cortical regions, i.e., about the world. 
The brain is treated, in accordance with this view, as a giant Bayesian engine always 
trying to predict the next perceptual state based on a constant and coupled flow of 
information between different hierarchical processing regions and input signals.  
 
 The predictive coding hypothesis thus challenges the traditional account of visual 
processing as consisting of the feedforward channelling of information from lower-
level to higher-level visual areas, with the information finally analysed at the highest 
levels. Instead, the hypothesis depicts our perceptual understanding of the world as 
driven by top–down predictions, which nevertheless are a response to constant 
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bottom–up input signals. The resulting picture is one in which there is a constant and 
dynamic coupling of sensory and motor representations, with the higher-level cortical 
regions constantly hypothesizing what the next input to the lower-level regions is 
going to be, i.e., constantly hypothesizing about potentiality; the perfect framework 
for a notion such as that of shared object-related affordance. For it is potentiality—
action potentiality in particular—that the higher-order cortical processing regions 
seem to have evolved to capture. When I witness an agent with a suitably located 
object in their peripersonal space, my brain is already busy anticipating what the next 
perceptual state is going to be, given the information available, and in doing so, it 
yields a representation of the array of motor acts that both the observed agent and I 
could engage in. Generalized predictive coding, like the enactive and sensorimotor 
view of perception, brings in a circular causality that makes the traditional boundary 
between sensory and motor representations disappear. It thus seems to be the optimal 
view of neural representations to be exploited in the theoretical treatment of shared 
object-related affordances. Yet, within such a theoretical treatment, the space 
mirroring functionality does not appear to play any significant role. 
 
 It may thus very well be that the notion of shared object-related affordance 
brings with it a much needed revision of the standard dichotomy between motor and 
non-motor representational states. It may also be that, once the representations 
allegedly generated by the space mirror mechanism are given an enactive, embodied 
and extended interpretation, the space mirror hypothesis does not have to face the 
problem of potential action underdetermination highlighted in the previous section. 
However, the space mirror advocate faces, on this more charitable interpretation of 
their view, a different, but equally difficult problem. For, if understanding of the 
potential motor acts that an object affords an observed agent is achieved through the 
sensorimotor representations generated by shared object-related affordances, all the 
explanatory work seems to be done by the enactive dynamics of the representations of 
such an affordance structure—not the mirroring functionality itself. Furthermore, on 
this interpretation, the enactive dynamics of the affordance structure plays the role of 
prior expectations for recognizing sensorimotor trajectories, and it thus seems to be 
much better suited to an account of sequential motor prediction akin to the account 
offered by the predictive coding hypothesis. 
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 The dilemma for the space mirror advocate is thus clear. On the one hand, should 
motor intention be required for action understanding, as per the action MNS 
hypothesis, the space mirror hypothesis would fall short of explaining understanding 
of action potentiality, as there is no motor intention without motor act goal-
relatedness. On the other hand, if it is just understanding of potential motor acts that 
the space mirror hypothesis accounts for (and key in such understanding is the 
enactive and sensorimotor nature of the representations generated by shared object-
related affordances) then, not only does the hypothesis seem to fail to do any real 
explanatory work, but there is an alternative account that appears to be much better 
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